This is a book about insurgency and some of its major tools--terrorism and guerilla warfare. William Polk begins by observing that one factor is common to insurgencies (page xiii): "no matter how they differ in form, duration, and intensity, a single thread runs through them all: opposition to foreigners. Occupation by outsiders creates the conditions for insurgency, then. That is the central thesis of his book.
Throughout the book, he explores his thesis by examination of a number of case studies--some well know and some less so. The first case study has an ironic twist to it--it is the American Revolution. He then considers, in order by chapter, the Spanish resistance to Napoleon, the Philippine insurrection, the Irish case, Yugoslav partisans in World War II, Greece after World War II, Kenya and the Mau Mau, Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.
One commonality across many (but not all) of these examples is that the insurgency begins with a ludicrously small number of militants. However, there are circumstances where this small group will expand and, in the end, triumph over the occupation. Other trends: as the small bands successfully carry out ambushes and otherwise annoy the foreigners, others within the occupied country begin to pay attention. Often, the dominant government then seeks to suppress the rebellion. Sometimes, they become so oppressive and repressive that it begins to trigger larger and larger numbers of people joining the insurgency.
Another factor that is important is Mao's famous argument that in a successful insurgency, the rebellious ones are like "fish" in a "sea" of sympathetic people, able to hide among and operate within the supportive masses.
One interesting tidbit in this book focuses on current American counterinsurgency theory. The current handbook, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, has as one of its authors Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, currently in charge of the American action in Iraq. Many people assess the current counterinsurgency doctrine as sound (and, indeed, if you read Petraeus' manual, you will find it pretty convincing), but Polk demurs. He contends that despite its apparent freshness, the American doctrine is still flawed. Polk remains deeply skeptical of any occupying power being able to determine beforehand if the occupation will be successful or if insurgency will develop and, in the end, triumph over the occupier.
I'm not sure that I am in accord with Polk in all details (his conclusion does not convince me), but it is a thought provoking work, and the various case studies provide historical examples of what can go right and what can go wrong for both insurgencies and occupying powers.
Worth a read. . . .
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Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq Hardcover – September 18, 2007
by
William R. Polk
(Author)
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Print length304 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherHarper
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Publication dateSeptember 18, 2007
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Dimensions5.5 x 1.09 x 8.25 inches
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ISBN-100061236195
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ISBN-13978-0061236198
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Editorial Reviews
About the Author
William R. Polk taught Middle Eastern history and politics and Arabic at Harvard until 1961, when he became a member of the Policy Planning Council of the U.S. Department of State. In 1965, he became Professor of History at the University of Chicago, where he established the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. His many books include The Birth of America and Understanding Iraq.
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Product details
- Publisher : Harper; 1st edition (September 18, 2007)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 304 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0061236195
- ISBN-13 : 978-0061236198
- Item Weight : 1 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.5 x 1.09 x 8.25 inches
-
Best Sellers Rank:
#1,593,408 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #509 in General Middle East Travel Guides
- #741 in Iraq History (Books)
- #1,625 in Iraq War History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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36 global ratings
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Reviewed in the United States on December 8, 2007
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Reviewed in the United States on April 26, 2012
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Former Kennedy appointee William R. Polk traces the history of guerrila warfare from the American Revolution through the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleon, the Philippine inserection against the US, the Irish experience, Tito in Yugoslavia, Greek civil war, the Mau Mau, Algeria, and Vietnam involving French and Americans.
Polk offers incisive observations, although faltering in denying the accuracy of the Domino Theory that motivated our involvement in Vietnam. The execution of the Domino Theory may not have been neatly accomplished following the fall of Saigon, but why should it be? The point is, it did happen with Laos toppling, Thailand unsuccessfully (!) invaded twice, and Cambodia falling to the Khmer Rouge whose legendary incompetency was outdone by the government which led to the Killing Fields, certainly the strongest possible evidence of the accuracy of the Domino Theory concept.
Polk seeks to draw conclusions about what each of the guerrila wars have in common and the means that seemed acceptable in some guerrila actions as applied unsuccessfully in other wars (as in the attempt to sue the strategic hamlet relocation plan that had worked in Malaya to Viet Nam where it was doomed to fail because of the deep idenitification of people with their village.
Polk identifies three stages of guerrila warfare.
First, establish the right to speak for the nation often by simply becoming the opposition. In the process, establish unity by eliminating challenges. In the American Revolution, the struggle between rebel and loyalist actually took precedence over the struggle against the British at times.
Second, destroy the administration which is where the wave of VC-inspired assassinations of government officials and teachers came in. The VC screwed up during the Tet offensive when they took over Hue by immediately begining wholesale assassination of innocent functionaries giving them a black eye. Only action by the North Vietnamese Army got them to stop.
Although everyone swallowed whole the double-talk about "reeducation" after the victory of the war, no doubt there were more deaths. Thensubstitute your own administration in areas you control (as the Committees of Safety did during the American Revolution, as did guerrilas in Viet Nam, Greece, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere.
Third, begin military action. By this time, presumably, you already control a lot more than the central government will be willing to admit as happened in Viet Nam.
In a 1963 study, Polk assigned a figure to each element to established scale of importance.
Polk felt that the political element was 80% of the insurgency, existing the old order while substituting a replacement was 15%, and the military element was only 5%. It was not well received at the time, but based on our experience with guerrila actions since then, seems not unreasonable. It is exceptionally tough to successfully beat a guerrila war. On the other hand, we have learned that we ignore them at our peril.
Interesting book.
Polk offers incisive observations, although faltering in denying the accuracy of the Domino Theory that motivated our involvement in Vietnam. The execution of the Domino Theory may not have been neatly accomplished following the fall of Saigon, but why should it be? The point is, it did happen with Laos toppling, Thailand unsuccessfully (!) invaded twice, and Cambodia falling to the Khmer Rouge whose legendary incompetency was outdone by the government which led to the Killing Fields, certainly the strongest possible evidence of the accuracy of the Domino Theory concept.
Polk seeks to draw conclusions about what each of the guerrila wars have in common and the means that seemed acceptable in some guerrila actions as applied unsuccessfully in other wars (as in the attempt to sue the strategic hamlet relocation plan that had worked in Malaya to Viet Nam where it was doomed to fail because of the deep idenitification of people with their village.
Polk identifies three stages of guerrila warfare.
First, establish the right to speak for the nation often by simply becoming the opposition. In the process, establish unity by eliminating challenges. In the American Revolution, the struggle between rebel and loyalist actually took precedence over the struggle against the British at times.
Second, destroy the administration which is where the wave of VC-inspired assassinations of government officials and teachers came in. The VC screwed up during the Tet offensive when they took over Hue by immediately begining wholesale assassination of innocent functionaries giving them a black eye. Only action by the North Vietnamese Army got them to stop.
Although everyone swallowed whole the double-talk about "reeducation" after the victory of the war, no doubt there were more deaths. Thensubstitute your own administration in areas you control (as the Committees of Safety did during the American Revolution, as did guerrilas in Viet Nam, Greece, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere.
Third, begin military action. By this time, presumably, you already control a lot more than the central government will be willing to admit as happened in Viet Nam.
In a 1963 study, Polk assigned a figure to each element to established scale of importance.
Polk felt that the political element was 80% of the insurgency, existing the old order while substituting a replacement was 15%, and the military element was only 5%. It was not well received at the time, but based on our experience with guerrila actions since then, seems not unreasonable. It is exceptionally tough to successfully beat a guerrila war. On the other hand, we have learned that we ignore them at our peril.
Interesting book.
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Reviewed in the United States on October 18, 2010
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Violent Politics takes a depressing but realistic view that "hearts and minds" are the most important aspect of winning against an insurgency. Military efforts are usually too little (or too much) and too late, merely further alienating a population already traumatized by internal problems and insurgency. Such an analysis, if correct, does not bode well for US and Allied efforts in Afghanistan.
3 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on October 28, 2014
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Good comprehensive look at the rise and growth of insurgent movements. Good critique of how both antagonists reactions further or hinder their own efforts. While very military it is a description of a political movement that uses violent action to carry out its agenda. Worth reading and well documented for those that want to have access to primary source
Reviewed in the United States on November 21, 2017
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Taught me a lot about intellectualism.
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Reviewed in the United States on July 23, 2017
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great book
Reviewed in the United States on January 30, 2018
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Thoroughly enjoyable and extremely informative on many events that I had never understood. Succinct and well written
Reviewed in the United States on June 10, 2009
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This book offers further proof that those who don't understand history are destined to repeat it It is a comprehensive and clear discussion of the history of insurgency from the American Revoloution through the current mess in Iraq. I think of it as an education in one book. I found the history of the troubles in Ireland especially enlightening. Anyone who can continue to defend our incursions into Vietnam and Iraq after reading this book is delusional.
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Top reviews from other countries

M. Meyer
4.0 out of 5 stars
Übersicht über Strukturen von Aufständen
Reviewed in Germany on January 13, 2010Verified Purchase
William R. Polk ist ein anerkannter Experte für den Nahen Osten und widmet sich in diesem Buch Aufständen und Guerillakriegen. Er stellt dabei zunächst die These auf, dass sich gewisse Strukturen und Phänomene stetig wiederholen. Danach geht er historisch einzelne Konflikte durch (Amerikanischer Unabhängigkeitskampf, Spanien, Irland, Indochina/Vietnam, etc.) und weist hier diese Element nach.
Gut: Polk verliert sich nicht in militärhistorischen Anekdoten oder Schlachtengeschichte. Er stellt stets den Gesamtzusammenhang dar und bleibt auf einer sehr abstrakten Ebene. Leser, die sich für einzelne Episoden besonders interessieren, müssen sich weiterführende Literatur zuwenden.
Polk sieht die Chancen einen Aufstand zu bekämpfen als allgemein schlecht. Er weißt deutlich auf die Kosten (nicht nur die finanziellen) der laufenden Operationen im Irak und in Afghanistan hin.
Leider nur 4 Sterne, da Polk am Ende seines Buches die Frage, wie man den nun mit Aufständen umgehen muss, nach meinem Ermessen unbeantwortet lässt. Dazu empfehle ich die RAND Studie The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lessons for Afghanistan", die Alexandre Bennigsen 1981 verfasst hat.
Gut: Polk verliert sich nicht in militärhistorischen Anekdoten oder Schlachtengeschichte. Er stellt stets den Gesamtzusammenhang dar und bleibt auf einer sehr abstrakten Ebene. Leser, die sich für einzelne Episoden besonders interessieren, müssen sich weiterführende Literatur zuwenden.
Polk sieht die Chancen einen Aufstand zu bekämpfen als allgemein schlecht. Er weißt deutlich auf die Kosten (nicht nur die finanziellen) der laufenden Operationen im Irak und in Afghanistan hin.
Leider nur 4 Sterne, da Polk am Ende seines Buches die Frage, wie man den nun mit Aufständen umgehen muss, nach meinem Ermessen unbeantwortet lässt. Dazu empfehle ich die RAND Studie The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lessons for Afghanistan", die Alexandre Bennigsen 1981 verfasst hat.

Tony Jefferies
5.0 out of 5 stars
They say that insanity is repeating the same mistakes over ...
Reviewed in Canada on June 4, 2016Verified Purchase
They say that insanity is repeating the same mistakes over and over while expecting a different result, William Polk sets out the case against counterinsurgency with this in mind.
2 people found this helpful
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