LABOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF CONTRASTING FORMS OF ORGANIZATION AND REPRESENTATION

Split in Russian Labor Unions after Perestroika

During the Soviet era, labor unions generally served as an “arm of the state” (Cook 1997), “transmission belts” of the Communist Party, and conductors of the party policy at the enterprise level (Ashwin 1999; Ashwin and Clarke 2003; Clarke 1993). The single hierarchy of labor unions' organizations, with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) on the top, incorporated almost 100 percent of the labor force. Trade union membership was obligatory and based on “inertia,” membership dues were simply withheld automatically from the payrolls. The primary union organizations worked mainly as distributors and administrators of a wide range of public goods and social services provided to workers at the enterprises. Among the most important functions of trade unions were the control and distribution of benefits from Social Insurance Funds (for sickness, maternity, disability, etc.), establishment of eligibility of pensions and state welfare benefits, and providing union members with access to free or subsidized health facilities, vacation resorts, children's summer recreation, and sport facilities. Unions were also involved in allocating housing managed by enterprises, child care places, and deficit goods provided through the enterprise. Therefore, workers' perceptions of labor unions were more as a source of goods and benefits than collective representatives and defenders of their labor rights. At the same time, labor unions (in the face of VTsSPS) possessed extensive political power and had come to accumulate substantial property (buildings, resorts, clinics, sport and recreation facilities, etc.) as well as considerable financial resources.

In 1990, after Perestroika, a new national trade union umbrella organization was established—the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR)—which became the post-Soviet successor of the VTsSPS, inheriting its resources and the advantage of being the monopolistic representative of workers' interests. The FNPR's activities and policy agenda of that period were mainly aimed at continuing state social responsibility for both living standards and production. At the same time, the beginning of the 1990s liberalization and economic reforms caused a tremendous wave of labor protest that the Soviet-legacy labor unions had neither the ability nor the desire to support. The alternative labor unions took the lead in the labor protests (Clarke 1993; Cook 1997). The emergence of the first really Independent Trade Union of Miners (NPG) in the fall of 1991 marked the beginning of the alternative labor movement in Russia (Bizyukov 2003). Since that time, two union camps have formed in the Russian labor movement. On the one side, there are the “official” or “traditional” trade unions affiliated with the FNPR; on the other side, there are the so-called alternative or free labor unions, which are independent from the FNPR. Among the biggest associations of free labor unions at the national level are the All-Russia Confederation of Labor (VKT) and the Russian Confederation of Labor (KTR), which have representatives in the Russian tripartite commission for regulation of social and labor relations. Another big interregional alternative labor union is the Trade Union Association of Russia (SOTSPROF).

The relationships between official and alternative labor unions from the very beginning and until today can be characterized as an ongoing and constantly growing confrontation. The representatives of the alternative unions accuse traditional unions of betraying labor interests and conspiracy with the employers. Official labor unions in their turn consider their counterparts as “provocateurs” who try to get political capital from unjustified aggressiveness against management, and “screw up” the process of collective bargaining. The contradictions reach the highest points at the enterprises where both types of trade unions are represented. In these enterprises, the leaders of official labor unions often coalesce with the administration in order to put pressure on the members and leaders of the free labor unions, forcing them either to quit membership in the free labor union or to reduce protest activities (Bizyukov 2003).

The ongoing conflict between “official” and “free” labor unions reflects fundamental differences between two modes of labor interest representation that exist at the same time in Russia—the distributional or bureaucratic mode, based on cooperation (social partnership) between the labor union and the employer, and the protest mode, which is focused on the defense of labor rights, typically involving confrontation with the employer. The distinction between the two modes is becoming even more evident under the influence of globalization. The spread of transnational corporations provides new challenges for both official and alternative labor unions. For official unions, these challenges have resulted in the emergence of the new intraregional and even international “corporative” labor unions (like, for instance, labor unions of LUKOIL, GAZPROM, SIBUR, etc.). “Corporative” unions work for distribution of social benefits provided by the corporation and serve as a channel of feedback about the emergence of problems among the personnel. For these unions, membership fees are not the main source of financial resources. In the companies based on foreign capital, the “corporative” unions serve also as intermediaries between foreign management and Russian labor culture and labor relations, assisting corporations in building corporate solidarity (Kozina 2009). On the other side, many transnational corporations based on foreign capital became a basis for the emergence of the most militant and organized alternative unions operating today in Russia (free labor unions at FORD, GM, RENO, and other enterprises). These new alternative unions also exploit the international status of TNCs (transnational corporations) by using the channels of international labor solidarity and support from international trade union organizations.

The phenomenon of the “divided labor movement” is not unique for Russia. Many Eurasian post-socialist countries experience similar contradictions between newly emerged militant labor organizations and old Soviet-legacy trade unions, with the dominance of the later in labor sphere. For instance, in Ukraine, there is a long-lasting confrontation between the Federation of Trade Unions (FPU) and free labor groups like the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine, National Confederation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (NKPU), and the National Forum of Trade Unions of Ukraine (NFPU). In Belarus, these are the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus and Belarus Independent Trade Union. It can be assumed that the dual model of labor interest representation is generally predetermined by contradictory economic and political models of post-socialist transforming societies. Overall, the dominance of the distributive system, based on cooperation between the employer and the union, over the protest model signifies that labor relations based on market mechanisms have not replaced the previous administrative system in these countries.

“Free” and “Official” Labor Unions

Nominally, Russia compares well with other countries in terms of trade union membership. About 54 percent of the overall workforce is reported to be organized. The FNPR retains an almost monopolistic position in Russian organized labor. It claims to represent 95 percent of unionized workers, 45 percent of total Russian employees, and 75.1 percent of employees at the unionized enterprises (enterprises and organizations that have primary trade union organizations) (see FNPR official website http://www.fnpr.ru). According to the FNPR annual report, which remains one of the only available sources of data about labor unions, the highest rates of union membership are among workers in the transportation construction sector (94.2 percent), the employees of the security agencies of the Russian Federation (Profsojuz rabotnikov organov bezopasnosti Rossii) (88.4 percent), and among the workers in the oil and gas, mining, and related construction industries (84.7 percent). In geographic terms, the official trade union organizations are best represented in the Republic of Dagestan (94.9 percent), Kabardino-Balkaria (93.1 percent), North Ossetia-Alania (92.7 percent), Tatarstan (90 percent), Belgorod region (90.1 percent), and Chechnya (89.3 percent). Union membership continues to decline in recent years, from 27.8 million members in 2006 to 24.2 million members in 2010. The number of primary organizations has also declined, from 210 in 2006 to 191 in 2010 (Figures 1, 2).

Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics about free labor unions. Partially, this is predetermined by open repressions by the employers over the most militant unions so that they have to conceal the real membership, and even allow their members “double” union membership. On the other hand, some unions deliberately overstate the number of members to make better image of the union. Another reason is the less organizational capacity of free unions, the lack of resources to maintain statistical recordings. According to the Federation of European Employers (http://www.fedee.com/tradeunions.html#Russia), the All-Russian Confederation of Labor (VKT) has about three million members, and the Confederation of Labor of Russia (KTR) 1.2 million members. The Trade Union Association of Russia (SOTSPROF) encompasses a total of 500,000 members. Alternative labor unions are strong among the miners, airline pilots, air traffic controllers, dockers, railway locomotive crews, and automobile industry workers.

Free labor unions differ from the official ones in many respects. Traditional Soviet-legacy labor unions follow the ideology of “social partnership,” stressing the commonality of interests among employees and employers. They are well incorporated into the Russian system of social partnership and claim to be the sole monopolistic representative of the rights of all Russian employees. The free labor unions are more oriented toward using workers mobilization as a key resource in confrontation with an employer; instead of emphasizing consensus, they focus on conflict. This does not mean that free labor unions refuse any possibility of peaceful dialogue with employers. Many strong alternative unions are successful in collective bargaining and concluding collective agreements.

Unlike official unions that usually build their primary organizations “from above,” free labor unions typically emerge on the wave of some protest action “from below,” often at enterprises unionized by the official trade unions. In this case, the newly created unions experience double pressure—not only from the employer, but also from the official union, which makes it very hard for the new organization to survive. Usually, the newly organized labor unions can persist only if they get organizational and informational support from a larger local free labor union organization or association that has access to more extensive resources. Their militant character and protest ideology make free labor union activists a target for tough administrative pressure and even physical assaults.

The numerous ways that free labor unions emerge explains the high organizational diversity within the movement—from tiny, semiformal activist groups at the enterprise level up to regional and interregional multilevel organizations encompassing thousands of members. It is important that, unlike official unions, free labor unions include only workers and exclude any kind of managerial personnel (and sometimes even specialists). The structure of primary organizations is often informal and based on networks; union leaders (activists) rely heavily on interpersonal relations and ways of communicating with their members. Sometimes, such methods are dictated by the absence of office space at the enterprise that has to be provided by the employer. Sometimes especially militant unions deliberately avoid using any formal structures and contacts with the enterprise in order to avoid becoming vulnerable to administrative pressure. The union staff, especially at the enterprise level, often works on a volunteer basis since free labor unions cannot afford to spend much money on bureaucratic organization. Unlike official unions that can use resources accumulated by their predecessor during the Soviet era, free labor unions must rely almost exclusively on membership fees.

Both official and free labor unions experience difficulties attracting new members even though the nature of membership varies among different types of unions. For the official unions, membership is usually formal or based on “inertia.” Joining the union is not so much a conscious choice, but a traditional given, often carried out automatically when a new employee starts a job. As in Soviet times, people do not expect the union to defend their rights, but to provide them additional benefits. For the free trade unions, voluntary and active membership is more typical, and internal union solidarity is highly valued. These qualities are particularly true for militant unions since membership comes at high risk for workers. The class principle often underlines the ideology of union membership in free unions—managers and sometimes even specialists are not allowed to join the union; only workers and low-paid personnel are considered as trustworthy and reliable members. Leaders of free trade unions are generally charismatic individuals, capable of mobilizing people; by contrast, the leaders of official trade unions are usually skilled in working within administrative and bureaucratic systems.

The official and free trade unions differ in terms of their repertoire of collective actions. Free unions much more frequently use noninstitutional forms of protest, such as unsanctioned rallies, pickets, strikes, and street actions. They actively cooperate with various social movement and protest groups, organizing coalitions and participating in joint protest actions. The difference in relations with the authorities is also apparent. Despite the fact that union leaders emphasize their nonpartisan character, the protest activity of the free unions a priori includes overt or covert opposition to the authorities. The very rise of the alternative trade unions is connected to dissatisfaction with the existing system of defending worker rights, and that means coming into conflict with the status quo. In general, the differences described here demonstrate that the official trade unions are a bureaucratic structure, while the free unions are closer to a social movement.

Western researchers of Russian labor relations, with a few rare exceptions, ignore the existence of free labor unions because of their relatively small numbers. Nevertheless, the activity and influence of the free unions in recent years has significantly grown. This is manifested first of all in the increasing numbers and durations of labor protest actions (mostly wildcat strikes, unregistered protest actions, and stop actions) organized by free labor unions. Another trend is the growing consolidation and organizational strengthening of the free labor movement, the intensifying attempts to unite free labor unions under a single umbrella association (KTR or SOTSPROF), and the formation of strong and militant interregional and intersectoral associations of free labor unions like the Interregional Trade Union of the Automobile Industry Workers (MPRA). Free labor unions in recent years have increased their involvement in political activity (a phenomenon that is not entirely welcome by all union leaders). While official unions seek an alliance with the ruling party (United Russia), and Vladimir Putin, free labor unions focus more on building political contacts with left-wing political parties and groups (such as, for instance, ROTFRONT), and were trying to establish relations with President Medvedev. The result is a growing political competition with the official unions. There is also increasing collaboration and coalition building with various actors of civil society—social movements and interest groups, especially at the local and regional levels.

All this activity has led some Russian researchers to describe a revitalization of the labor union movement in Russia (Bizyukov 2011a; Kleman 2007; Kozina 2007). However, despite some successful protest actions and the growing consolidation of free labor unions, they remain less organized and centralized than official unions. Among the factors hindering further consolidation are the internal contradictions of the free labor movement related to its organizational diversity, the semiformal character of some especially militant unions, and the ambitions of charismatic union leaders. The most important problem of the alternative unions continues to be their institutional exclusion, which is largely a consequence of the existing Labor Code.

The New Labor Code and Social Partnership Model

Adopted in 2001, the new Labor Code finally solidified the tripartite system based on the ideology of “social partnership” that was meant to replace the ideology of “labor conflict” in contemporary capitalist societies. The system of social partnership in Russia was generally framed according to the classical European model. It is realized on several levels—from national (federal) and up to the level of the enterprise. The commissions of social partners at each level conclude collective agreements and achieve control over the partners' responsibilities. Although the system looks similar to the classic model, in reality, every level of social partnership in practice has some peculiarities predetermining the special design and practical implementation of the social partnership model in Russia.

It is important to understand that the European social partnership model (and, first of all, the so-called German model) had been developed under specific economic, social, and political conditions. The effectiveness of social partnership in European societies was ensured by the well-protected ideology of social peace, stable economy, strong welfare state, developed economic and financial institutions backing social partnership and welfare systems, and a sustainable set of labor laws including effective mechanisms of law enforcement (Hyman 2001; Streek 1997 and others). Not the least role belonged to “labor culture” as a set of shared considerations regarding partnership order and respect for labor rights shared by all participants of industrial relations (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). In Russia, with the transfer to “Kremlin capitalism,” shock privatization and the emergence of a new class of “wild” capitalists, the conflict between employees and employers remains one of the central social contradictions. The underdeveloped institutional base, weak control over the labor law enforcement, and the Soviet-legacy labor culture, alongside the poor mechanisms of labor rights protection, make the social partnership model inadequate and ineffective.

The social partnership system has inherited from the Soviet times the dominant role of the state in the development of social policy at both the federal and regional levels. This makes the basic principle of equal partners a fiction—the leading role in collective bargaining belongs to the state, then management, and only then, the labor unions. The absence (or poorly developed nature) of collective representation institutions for the employers at the sectoral (branch) and regional levels makes the conclusion of sectoral and regional tariff agreements impossible or simply formal. The contents of regional and territorial agreements mostly repeat principles and norms already fixed in legislation, without any specific obligations and controlling mechanisms of their fulfillment. Sectoral agreements often do not work since the tariff levels agreed to are much lower than in the leading, or sometimes even middling, enterprises in the sector. On the other hand, sectoral and regional tariff agreements have a recommended character that does not allow primary union organizations to use them as an instrument (for pressing employers) in collective bargaining at the enterprise level.

According to the unanimous opinion of experts, the new Labor Code as a whole worsened the position of labor unions in their dialogue with employers:

As an addition to the general antiunion provisions, the new Labor Code particularly worsened the conditions of free labor unions. Among the key features were the following:

The above-mentioned peculiarities demonstrate an obvious contradiction between the Labor Code's officially declared idea of providing a pluralism of representative possibilities for hired labor and the de facto monopolization by the official trade unions of the right to provide such representation. The new Labor Code has sharpened opposition of official and free labor unions at the enterprises, undermined union solidarity and mutual support, making relations between unions even more contradictory. In the best case, official labor unions do not intervene into the fight of the administration against free labor unions, but very often they act on the side of the administration. By stimulating confrontation between labor unions for labor interest representation, the new Labor Code facilitates elimination of labor unions by one another (Kozina 2009). The absence of free competition among trade unions in the area of protecting worker rights and the limited institutional opportunities for alternative representation of labor interests leads to the compelled politicization of free unions which seek to be heard by the high-level authorities, and also to the radicalization of the protest actions. On the other hand, the new Labor Code has solidified the role of “official” unions as almost monopolistic labor representatives in a specific Neo-corporatist model of labor regulation with general dominance of the state.

Collective Agreements and the Role of Labor Unions at the Enterprises

According to the new Labor Code, collective bargaining between primary labor union organization and the employer (management) is considered a key instrument of social partnership at the enterprise level. Collective agreement resulting from a collective bargaining process is seen as a key document representing collective labor interests at the enterprise. Implementation of collective agreement is seen by both sides—administration and labor unions—as a main condition of “preserving peace” at the enterprise. The ideology of social partnership is manifested in the endeavors by both sides to solve problems in a peaceful way, and a mutual interest in causing no harm to the economic situation of the enterprise. Generally, the impression that “we are in one boat” dominates; serious conflicts are not welcomed by either side.

One of the problems obstructing the position of primary unions in their dialog with the administration of the enterprise is the lack of institutional support from the so-called trade union vertical (supervising agencies in the union hierarchical structure) when primary organizations really need it. This is equally true either for the situations of collective bargaining or labor disputes, especially when primary organizations encounter problems that go beyond the boundaries of a particular enterprise. Being isolated from the supervising (branch or territorial) union agencies, the primary organizations found themselves “one on one” with the employer who possesses immeasurably more bargaining power. Primary organizations are seeking more attention from the supervising agencies to their everyday problems and often accuse the top union organizations of being excessively involved in political games rather than focusing on problems of primary organizations (Olimpieva 2010b). The discontent with supervising agencies provokes a conflict between big primary organizations and union top agencies regarding the amounts of deductions of collected membership fees. The primary organizations complain that they do not receive the institutional support they are entitled to in return for the money deducted from the salaries of their employees.

Isolation from institutional support is only part of a bigger and more profound problem of power imbalance in the relationship between trade unions and employers, which undermines the very essence of social partnership in the enterprise. Although the directors are desperately interested in nonconflict relationships with labor unions and welcome the model of social partnership in principle, they do not consider labor unions as an equal and respectable partner (Olimpieva 2010a). The sphere of partnership is narrowed to a few particular functions that should be, in the opinion of the employers, carried out by labor unions. Unions are viewed by the directors as a subdivision of the human resources department whose job is to motivate and support worker morale, or to help in distributing social benefits and conducting social policy at the enterprise. They do not deal with worker–management relations; rather, they organize social work during workers' free time, vacations, sports, and cultural and educational work. The unions have the job of helping “weak” or “problematic” workers when strong workers, in the opinion of management, do not need such intermediaries in dealing with their bosses. Labor unions are also expected in turn to be oriented toward partnership in achieving common economic goals, and to use a “realistic approach” to the economic status of the enterprise in their demands.

The power imbalance is manifested in the voluntaristic behavior of the directors who can simply refuse to participate in negotiations with some militant union leader unless they are replaced by someone more tractable. In the enterprises with the dual union representation, the directors prefer to choose as a main social partner the more manageable “official” union in collective bargaining while the demands of free unions are simply ignored. Not providing information is another sign of the power disbalance. For almost all unions, getting information about the enterprise's economic situation and salaries remains a big problem. According to the law, this information should be provided to labor unions by the administration. However, even the most “friendly” management partners never do it or provide only a stripped-down version of the information required. Labor unions are forced to use informal channels to get this information or even to steal it with the help of union members working in the firm administration.

The domination of the employer in labor–capital relations is also strengthened by the Soviet legacy dominance of interpersonal relations over institutional mechanisms when it comes to solving “hot” problems. Not the least factor is the economic and organizational dependence of the primary union organizations on the enterprise administration. That is why, according to the expression of one trade union committee chairman, today it is not possible to speak about a social partnership in Russian enterprises, but about a “social coexistence if the employer wants it.”

As a result, most unions are involved in distributing resources, as in Soviet times. Such a distributional model of representing worker interests is more characteristic for official trade unions and is dominant today. For free unions, the protest model is more typical. They represent labor interests by focusing on defending worker rights rather than distributing various benefits. Nevertheless, even the alternative unions, especially the large and well-established ones, engage in social work, answering the traditional expectations of workers inherited from the Soviet times.

Nevertheless, it would not be correct to draw a direct analogy between today's redistributive model and the situation during the Soviet period. Since then, there have been changes in the sources, size, and content of the goods that are distributed, and the unions are constantly seeking new types of services and support for their members (e.g., credit unions, special insurance systems, etc). As a result, there is great diversity in the distributive models.

It is possible to distinguish at least two types of distributive models that are mainly used by primary labor union organizations in the enterprises:

“Mutual help model.” The central notion of this model is “help”—labor unions are seen as an intermediary organization assisting their members in solving different problems and providing support that they would not get elsewhere. This includes not only labor-related problems like wages and salaries, working conditions and working hours that the labor union is supposed to negotiate with the employer, but also a wide range of individual problems that workers encounter in everyday life. For example, labor unions assist their members in writing appeals and petitions to the courts and different official agencies, preparing documents for registration of private property (privatization of property), selling or buying apartments and summer cottages, etc. For these purposes, some labor unions even hire specialists—lawyers—providing free consulting services for union members. Another important form of help provided by labor unions is financial support in the form of “material help” or interest-free loans, including through mechanisms such as the so-called black cash (unofficial loans not reported to the authorities) and special health insurance schemes invented by labor unions. A modified form of mutual help model is the “insurance model,” which is also based on the idea of help but mainly in cases of emergency (accidents, financial disasters, illnesses, etc.).

“Service model.” In the case of the service model, the primary labor union is seen as a client-oriented agency providing the special service of “selling” an employee to the employer. Here, the union plays the role of an intermediary lobbying for decent salaries, good working conditions, and social benefits for the workers, and also a provider of a range of services such as sports, recreation, entertainment, celebrations, etc. For these services, labor unions use funds that they manage to “squeeze out” from the employer through formal and informal negotiations, as well as the unions' own resources collected in the form of membership fees. Thus, the amount and quality of services and the well-being of the union itself considerably depend on “good will” of the employer.

Labor Unions and Recent Trends in Labor Protest

In the beginning of Perestroika, the labor protest movement, and in particular the mass miners' strikes of 1989–1991, had a great influence on the demise of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a new Russian economic and political order with Boris Yeltsin as president (Bizyukov 2003; Borisov 2001; Crowley and Ost 2001, and others). In their demands, miners went far beyond pure economic survival issues, and demanded the general reorganization of the economy and changes in the political order of the country. In the mid-90s, the level of worker protests remained relatively high, but its influence on the economic and political course of the country had declined. A new wave of strikes and labor protest actions emerged at the end of the 1990s as a reaction to the desperate economic conditions. In 1996, Goskomstat had registered 8,278 strikes with 663,900 participants.

Starting with 1997, the leading role in the new wave of labor protest was played by the budget sector employees who provided 70 percent of the strikers (887,300) (Germanov 2009). Protesters did not make any political demands; over 95 percent of strikes came as a result of nonpayment of salaries (Greene and Robertson 2008). The lack of reaction from the economic and political establishment to the protesters' demands led to the escalation of labor protest to the use of extreme forms of protest, such as going on hunger strikes (840 cases during the period 1997–2000), suicide (30 cases), blockades of the railways and roads, etc. All these activities brought that period the name of “railway wars.” In the beginning of the 2000s, there was a decline in the protest labor movement caused to a great extent by the improving economic situation based on rising oil and gas prices in the international market, and economic and political recentralization. Since the mid-2000s, according to experts, the estimated number of labor protests has been growing again (Bizyukov 2011a, 2011b; Greene and Robertson 2008; Kleman 2007; Kozina 2007). The new wave of labor protest is characterized by some specific features that mark a new step in the development of the Russian labor movement (Bizyukov 2011b; Robertson and Green 2010).

The scale of labor protest in today's Russia is difficult to measure. Official statistics record a limited number of protest activities, and these are mainly “legal” strikes. As the new provisions of the Labor Code make it almost impossible to organize legal strikes, the number of strikes according to official statistics has been constantly declining in recent years. Thus, according to Rosstat reports, in 2007, there were only eight strikes, in 2008, four strikes, just one in 2009, and none in 2010. There is no official information about collective labor disputes that are often accompanied by various forms of protest activities. However, according to the independent monitoring of labor protests conducted by the Center for Social-Labor Rights (TsSTP, http://www.trudprava.ru), the overall number of protest actions, including stop-actions and strikes as it is shown on Figure 3, has been increasing in number in the hundreds (767 over the last 45 months)(Bizyukov 2011b). The intensity of the protests (the monthly average of protests in a given period) reached a maximum in 2009 (22.7). The figure for the first three quarters of 2011 is very close to this level (21.6) (Ibid.). It is important that the forms and the content of labor protest are also changing in comparison with the situation in the 90s.

The growing protest labor movement is predetermined by a number of conditions that exist in Russia today (Kleman 2010). First of all, there is the relative stabilization of the economic situation at enterprises that has correspondingly caused an increase in the level of workers' economic expectations. Second, the spread of transnational corporations in the Russian economy provides the possibility to compare salaries and working conditions among Russian workers and workers in other countries. Third, strengthening of relationships with the international labor movement facilitates the transfer of international trade union experience in organizing and fighting the employers. Fourth, the renewal of the enterprises' personnel as a result of generational change, the inflow of the post-Soviet generation of less paternalistically minded workers who are prepared to defend their labor rights.

The role of different labor unions in organizing protest actions is different. For the alternative labor unions, protest actions are a main source of their bargaining power in the dialog (confrontation) with the employer. Therefore, initiating and leading the protest actions is considered by free unions among their basic functions. In their call for protest actions, the most organized free labor unions rely upon the decision and support of their members. This is facilitated by the voluntary and conscious form of union membership, charismatic character of union leadership, and network-based organization. A very important role is played by regular information about the situation at the enterprise, which is spread by union leaders among the workers. If the situation is unfavorable, they raise the question about initiating a protest. The final decision is made by the workers.

For the official unions, the orientation to “hierarchical dialog” with the employer and preemption of any mass protest actions is the most typical strategy (Germanov 2009). The weak organizing potential of the “official” unions and formal membership predetermines the low possibility of worker mobilization for protest under union leadership. According to the union officials themselves, membership in the trade union would not play any role in the case of labor conflict. This means that a worker's decision whether to participate in the protest action would not be influenced by the fact of union membership (Olimpieva 2010a). In conflict situations, official labor unions usually serve as a “buffer” between employees and employers, and deliberately narrow down the sphere of their competence. For example, the demands of workers for indexation of salaries, of course, would be supported by labor unions, but only in the form of transmitting these demands to the administration and never in the form of creating a threat of labor protest. This tactic is especially typical for the corporative labor unions. Official labor unions try to avoid open protest actions by all possible means. If a spontaneous protest action nevertheless occurs, primary organizations in some cases take the lead (like in the case of Pikalevo), which causes a negative reaction from the supervising FNPR structures.

Conclusions

The existence of two different types of labor unions remains a distinctive feature of the Russian labor movement. The constant reemergence and growing activities of free labor unions means that, despite the general domination of FNPR in organized labor, there is still a need for labor right protection among the employees who are not satisfied with the official unions. (According to the Levada Center, 80 percent of the population in Russia feels that their labor rights are not well protected, and 50 percent thinks that they are not protected by anybody). The strategy of official labor unions is oriented on “hierarchical dialog” with the employers rather than on mobilizing workers for collective actions. This strategy is facilitated by the new Labor Code based on the ideology of “social partnership” and political engagements of the official unions with the ruling party (United Russia).

In this context, free labor unions and their orientation on labor protest and mobilization look like a “thorn in the official unions' side,” irritating and challenging the well-established new corporatist coalition of business, power, and official unions. Despite their small number and limited resources, the unfavorable legislative context and repressions against union leaders, free labor unions are getting stronger and becoming visible players in the field of labor relations. This is manifested in the new protest strategies, increasing institutional inclusion, organizational strengthening, and increasing international collaboration. However, the continued domination of the distributive model of labor interest representation demonstrates the preservation of the administrative system of regulating interactions between employers and employees, and the absence of market mechanisms in representing collective labor interests.